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Abstract
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda,
a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive
compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not
exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for
the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported
measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result
opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
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1 Introduction
Stated preference methods remain a popular tool to value non-marketed goods such as environmental
quality (e.g., Loureiro, Loomis, and Vazques, 2009), reduced risks to life and limb (Svensson, 2009),
and recreation (e.g., Deisenroth and Bond, 2009). But stated preference methods remain susceptible
to complaints of hypothetical bias – the gap between stated intentions and real economic commit-
ments.1 In general, the extant literature has collected a long line of evidence that hypothetical bias
exists across numerous types of mechanisms designed to reveal preferences truthfully, including the
popular valuation institution of binary referendum voting (see e.g., the views in McConnell, 1990;
Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, and Murphy, 1997; Haab, Huang, and Whitehead, 1999; Champ and
Bishop, 2001).
Social psychology oﬀers one explanation of hypothetical bias based on the lack of commitment
to truth telling (Jacquemet, James, Luchini, and Shogren, 2011). Commitment theory posits a
person is more likely to tell the truth after first making a strong promise (see Joule and Beauvois,
1998). Economic experiments support this idea. After pre-play communication, people who make
verbal promises about future actions are more likely to keep them when playing in both hold-up
and trust games (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).2 One time-
tested mechanism used to promote commitment is the solemn oath – a formal way to create the
bond between a person and telling the truth (see e.g., Sylving, 1959; Kiesler and Sakumura, 1966;
Schlesinger, 2008). According to this view, the oath acts as a foot-in-the-door that makes subjects
more likely to comply with the content of their promise. In addition, the commitment is stronger
when the promise is voluntary (Jacquemet, James, Luchini, and Shogren, 2011).
Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013) make a full-blown argument for the oath-as-
commitment device to reduce hypothetical bias in non-market preference elicitation. They designed
a series of testbed experiments using both induced and homegrown values Vickrey second-price auc-
tions and confirm the ability of a truth-telling oath to improve the reliability of elicited preferences.
They find that the oath induced sincere bidding behavior in an induced value auction, and the oath
induced bidders to take seriously both their budget and participation constraints in a homegrown
value auction. Their results suggested the oath worked in non-market valuation because people were
more committed to be truthful (unlike alternative cheap talk or guilt aversion explanations, see the
detailed discussion in Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2013).
The key question that the Jacquemet et al. study left open was how to apply the oath to stated
preference studies in the field that use discrete choice mechanisms, like the classic referendum style
vote on a public good. Carlsson, Kataria, Krupnick, Lampi, Lofgren, Qin, and Sterner (2013) and
1While exceptions exist, hypothetical bias persists (see Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Murphy, Stevens, and Weath-
erhead, 2005; Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2011).
2Also see Tavoni, Dannenberg, Kallis, and Löschel (2011) who design a public goods experiment to explore whether
a nonbinding “pledge and review” commitment system can increase the coordination of voluntary carbon emission
reductions. They find that subjects in the pledge treatments increased coordination significantly over the no-pledge
baseline.
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de Magistris and Pascucci (2014) address this gap by applying the oath to stated preference field
studies in China/Sweden and the Netherlands. While the results of these studies are suggestive, they
still do not allow an interested researcher to assess the ability of the oath to reduce hypothetical bias.
Since the oath scripts were implemented only in hypothetical homegrown surveys, there is no control
condition that elicits real values so one can assess the extent that hypothetical bias was removed or
remains. We need to step back and ask the basic question: Can the oath help reduce hypothetical
bias, if it exists, in a referendum vote?
Herein we extend our experimental work of the oath-as-commitment device to the classic referen-
dum voting preference elicitation format (see e.g., Cameron, 1991; Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer,
Radner, and Schuman, 1993; Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, and Murphy, 1997; Cummings and Taylor,
1999; List, Berrens, Bohara, and Kerkvliet, 2004; Carson, Groves, and List, 2014; James and Shogren,
2015). Our goal is to understand whether the individual-level oath (as administered by Jacquemet,
Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2013) can induce more sincere voting behavior within a collective-style
mechanism. We focus on the referendum voting format for three primary reasons. First, the referen-
dum remains popular in non-market valuation exercises because it is familiar, realistic, strategy-proof,
and straightforward to implement in the field (Carson and Groves, 2007). Second, an individual-level
oath would likely still be used in any field application of this collective mechanism given each person
would be voting in private, i.e., on-line survey, mail survey or mall-intercept techniques (see Carlsson,
Kataria, Krupnick, Lampi, Lofgren, Qin, and Sterner, 2013).
Third, the accumulated evidence from induced valuation experiments suggests that it is not an
empirically settled question as to whether the referendum format actually eliminates hypothetical bias
in voting behavior (see for example Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström, 1995; Champ and Bishop,
2001; Polomé, 2003; Vossler and Kerkvliet, 2003; Schläpfer, Roschewitz, and Hanley, 2004). People
voting in hypothetical referendum settings can be subject to social pressure bias and anchoring bias
which can lead to “yea-saying”, which can still create a gap between votes and actions (e.g., Green,
Jacowitz, Kahneman, and McFadden, 1998; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; James and Shogren, 2015).
Using an experimenter-controlled, pre-assigned induced value experimental design, Taylor, McKee,
Laury, and Cummings (2001) and Vossler and McKee (2006) both observed no hypothetical bias in
the referendum at the aggregate level, but they do find mistakes and mis-voting at the individual
level (see Burton, Carson, Chilton, and Hutchinson, 2007; Mozumder and Berrens, 2007; Collins and
Vossler, 2009; Murphy, Stevens, and Yadav, 2010). While several explanations have been oﬀered and
explored as to why people might mis-vote (i.e., preference uncertainty, other-regarding preferences),
no one up to now has explored whether the oath-as-commitment-device might create the environment
needed for more sincere voting behavior in the referendum.
We made four purposeful design choices in our experiment that diﬀer from the implementation
of a typical referendum style survey run in the field. First, we step back from the field and first test
whether the oath works for the referendum in the lab, as originally suggested by Coursey and Schulze
(1986). We pretest the elicitation mechanism before it is implemented in the field, both with and
without monetary incentives. In our lab experiment, we can link the eﬀect of the oath on hypothetical
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referendum bidding to hypothetical bias, and then explore individual motivations behind it (for a
review see, e.g., Shogren, 2005).
Second, we did not attempt to induce language to create “consequentiality” into our hypothetical
baseline design. Recall “consequentiality” is the idea that participants should treat a stated preference
style hypothetical valuation question as “real” if they believe some probability exists that the policy
will actually be implemented (see e.g., Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau, 2012). In contrast, our focus
is on creating real economic commitment with a non-market mechanism-the oath. We chose not to
conflate the issue with trying to induce consequentiality. We wanted to avoid adding another layer of
language that might or might not aﬀect our test of commitment. We do so because experiments that
test for the impact of consequentiality essentially introduce a new lottery stage into the valuation
exercise, with mixed results (see, e.g., Carson, Groves, and List, 2014, who argue that the votes for a
referendum were consequential). In contrast, Shogren and Tadevosyan (2011) find insincere bidding
behavior with “consequential” induced values in a second price auction–any uncertainty regarding
implementation of the contract lead to non-optimal bids.
Third, we used a classic monetary vote-then-donate format rather than the “advisory referendum”
format that has been used in some stated preference work (see Loomis, 2014, for a good review). Again
since the focus of our paper is to create real economic commitment with a non-market incentive device,
we want the participants to view the choice to vote “yay” as having real consequences under the oath,
and not just advice to policymakers.
Fourth, given our laboratory design, we chose one monetary value to vote “yay” or “nay”, and
we use five rounds of voting rather than one, in which only one round was binding (for multi-
price voting approach, see Messer, Poe, Rondeau, Schulze, and Vossler, 2010). Our aim is two-fold.
This choice makes our referendum design as close as possible to our earlier work in Jacquemet,
Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013). We can now calibrate and compare results across elicitation
mechanisms given the same good, same number of rounds, one randomly chosen binding auction, and
nearly identical instructions. In addition, by using several rounds with only one monetary value we
now have an objective measure of the strength of preferences as defined by how consistently subjects
respond (Rustichini, 2008). This allows us to assess the degree of hypothetical bias conditional on
our participants’ confidence levels of their own preferences. Some subjects were confident–5 “yay” or
“nay” votes–while others were less confident. We now can correlate the eﬀect of the oath with their
confidence.3
We design our lab experiment to contrast preferences elicited in the referendum under both
hypothetical and monetary incentives, with and without an oath. In the oath treatment, subjects
choose to sign a form freely in which they swear to tell the truth during the experiment. The
3This is reminiscent of certainty questions in the stated preferences literature, in which a researcher examines the
extent to which respondents are confident with their answers to willingness to pay questions by way of certainty scales
(see, e.g., Luchini and Watson, 2013). The diﬀerence with our voting-preference-certainty approach is that our measure
of confidence is an axiomatically grounded cardinal measure of the strength of preferences. In contrast, the answers to
certainty questions are subjective measures of confidence that make interpersonal comparisons diﬃcult.
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working hypothesis is that the oath will induce a person to be consistent with his or her initial
commitment to tell the truth in subsequent voting decisions. While our experimental design focuses
on eliciting homegrown values, we calculate the referendum price that will be voted on from the real
willingness to pay bids elicited in a second-price auction to buy a World Wide Fund (WWF) Adopt-
a-Dolphin program, as found in Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013). Our experimental
results provide additional support for the idea that the truth-telling oath can reduce hypothetical
bias. The oath created more real economic commitment – it reduces the proportion of “yes” votes,
though it does not completely eliminate observed hypothetical bias. We also explored behavior at the
individual level in more detail than previous referendum work by eliciting each voter’s attitudes as
reflected by: (a) the level of agreement with the WWF, (b) self-declared honesty, and (c) happiness.
We observe that respondents in the hypothetical treatment more strongly agreed with WWF than
in the real treatment (more “yea-saying”), but this result no longer held under oath. We then found
the self-reported measure of honesty increases under oath as compared to the baseline hypothetical
treatment. This suggests the oath incentivizes more subjects to be honest in the referendum than
otherwise. When considering happiness (given response time), we find that the oath decreases the
tendency to engage in self-serving assessments. Overall, our results further support the idea that
signing a solemn oath helps create the commitment needed to better link intentions and actions in
non-market valuation, and perhaps beyond (also see Jacquemet, Luchini, Shogren, and Zylbersztejn,
2015).
2 Experimental Design
We use a 2x2 experimental design in which the treatments are: (i) hypothetical and real referenda
and (ii) voting with and without a solemn oath to tell the truth. The design of the experiment closely
follows Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013), who studied the oath in both an induced value
and a homegrown value context using a second price auction. We adapt the original design to the
case of referendum voting.
2.1 Preference elicitation
We elicit preferences towards a private good with non-market attributes: adopting a dolphin through
a monetary donation to the World Wide Fund (hereafter WWF), a well-known non-governmental
organization devoted to “protecting the future of nature”.4 The WWF oﬀers people the opportunity
to “adopt” an endangered animal species. This adoption takes the form of an individual donation
to a program aimed at fighting threats like habitat loss and poaching faced by endangered animals.
Depending on the amount of the donation (among three possible values), donators are sent private
gifts such as an adoption certificate, a photograph of the animal, a cuddly stuﬀed toy dolphin, a
4The WWF was formerly named the World Wildlife Fund, which remains its oﬃcial name in the United States and
Canada. Since 2001, the WWF has been named the World Wide Fund in all other countries. More information about
the WWF can be found at http://www.worldwildlife.org/about/.
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gift box, and so on. For the purpose of our experiment, this procedure has the attractive feature of
ensuring the credibility of the donation, thanks both to the WWF label and to the documentation
associated with donation. We chose the entry-level oﬀer, i.e., an adoption certificate and photograph
are sent for each 25 USD (around 19 Euros when the experiments took place) donation to the WWF.
Since the photograph and the adoption certificate are symbolic in nature, this reduces the risk of
valuations being influenced by “by-product” goods, such as a cuddly stuﬀed toy or a gift box. The
adoption procedure is described to the subjects using a French-language, slightly modified version of
the oﬃcial web page set up by the WWF.5 The page provides a short description of a dolphin’s life
and of the WWF and, more importantly, a detailed presentation of the donation program and the
documentation (gifts) sent should a subject adopt a dolphin. In the written experimental instructions,
the good is described as follows:
The World Wide Fund for Nature, better known as the WWF, is an international non-
governmental organization for the protection of nature and of the environment, fully committed
to sustainable development. The head oﬃce is in Gland, Switzerland, and the association has
more than 4.7 million members worldwide, with an operational network in 96 countries. It is
a private organization aimed at protecting wild animals and their habitats as well as nature in
general, which it does by collecting funds for specific programs. Principally, it keeps a watchful
eye on whether international regulations are being respected, restores damaged natural areas
and provides training. As a way of financing its environmental protection activities, the WWF
oﬀers private individuals the opportunity to adopt an animal from an endangered species. The
funds thereby collected enable the WWF to continue protecting the environment and preserving
species diversity.
The donation decision is taken within groups of five subjects, through majority voting. Since we
divide each 20-subject session into smaller groups of five subjects (once for all, i.e. groups remain
the same for the whole experiment), four groups in each session are involved in five independent
referenda. On the adoption page subjects are asked to vote by clicking on either of two buttons: YES
or NO. We repeated five times the referendum in fixed groups: subjects take five successive votes
in identical referenda before learning the result of each. At the end of the sequence, one round out
of the five is randomly drawn. The votes of the randomly drawn referendum decides whether the
adoption passes: if more than 50% vote “yes”, everyone in the group adopts a dolphin.
A well-known concern with dichotomous choice mechanisms is that it provides a point identifica-
tion of the underlying preferences: if the price submitted to the vote is either too low or too high,
then it is non-informative about the extent of a hypothetical bias, and how to reduce this bias –
because elicited preferences become observationally insensitive to the elicitation environment. In the
same context as the one we study here, Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013) elicit the
whole demand curve of their subjects regarding the adoption of a dolphin but preferences are elicited
in a second price Vickrey auction rather than by a dichotomous choice mechanism.6 We use this
5The original page in English is available at gifts.worldwildlife.org/gift-center/gifts/Species-Adoptions/
Dolphin.aspx.
6The only diﬀerence with the referendum setting is that subjects bid for adopting one dolphin and the final donation
to the WWF equals the second highest bid value whereas, in the referendum, the donation to the WWF equals the
sum of the contributions of the group, if a majority votes “yes”.
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preliminary evidence to calibrate the amount of the donation to 11 Euros: this is a price at which
(i) preferences exhibit a significant hypothetical bias and (ii) corner solutions in voting behavior are
unlikely to be observed (see Fig.2, p.122, in Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren, 2013). With a
price set at this level, the good sold in the experiment is cheaper in the lab than in the market, so
we subsidize the winning donation to reach the market price when monetary incentives are binding.
Subjects are not told anything about this subsidy. This is enough to protect our data from the
censoring issue raised by, e.g., Cherry, Frykblom, Shogren, List, and Sullivan (2004). To confirm that
the observed values are independent of field opportunities, some items assessing subjects’ knowledge
about the procedure are included in a debriefing questionnaire.
2.2 Subject endowment
Our focus on donation behavior requires that subjects spend some money in the experiment. To
improve the external validity of our design – in particular, to avoid an inflation in the number of false
zeros – we want the subjects to enter the referendum with some positive experimental earnings to be
spent on the donation. This would mean giving subjects a large show-up fee for participating in the
experiment. Evidence suggests behavior can diﬀer depending on whether wealth is “windfall" or is
earned (also called endowment eﬀect, see, among others, Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002). In the
context of demand revelation using Vickrey auctions, Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2009)
show that earned money makes a significant diﬀerence to bidding behavior as compared to windfall
wealth. In line with these results, and to be as close as possible to actual stated preference surveys
in the field, we use an earned-wealth design. This also replicates a common feature of homegrown
valuation experiments focusing on hypothetical bias (e.g., Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Cummings,
Elliott, Harrison, and Murphy, 1997).
Earned wealth is implemented through a preliminary stage during which the subjects are asked
to answer 20 general knowledge questions.7 The set of questions was taken from the annals of the
“Concours de Catégorie B de la fonction publique” which is a civil service entry test for those who
hold at least the French baccalaureate.8 This is appropriate to discriminate between undergraduate
students. Accompanying each question is a list of four possible answers. Subjects are explicitly told
that one and only one out of the four is true, and that monetary earnings labeled in ecu (Experimental
Currency Unit) are proportional to correct answers. The position of the correct answer is randomized
between questions and the ordering of questions is kept the same for all subjects in all treatments.9
7In this context earned wealth is based more on knowledge and less so on eﬀort which can influence a person’s
view of a “fair allocation" of wealth (see for example Konow, 1996). However, it is worth noting that, because the
questionnaire is implemented across treatments, resulting bias may be diﬀerenced away.
8Our source is http://pagesperso-orange.fr/bac-es/qcm/annales_c02_r01.html, the full list of questions is
available from the authors upon request.
9From our previous work using this procedure, the risk of a subject scoring in such a way that earned wealth is
lower than 1 Euro is very unlikely. All subjects thus enter the referendum with earnings higher than 11 Euros.
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2.3 Experimental treatments
We use two treatment variables implemented through a factorial design – real /hypothetical combined
with oath/no oath. All four treatments are performed using a between subjects design – each subject
participates in only one out of the four treatments. Our benchmark situation is the hypothetical bias
that arises in the standard laboratory situation, i.e. with no oath.
The Real and Hypothetical treatments only diﬀer regarding the monetary consequences of the
adoption. In the real conditions, each subject belonging to groups in which the vote passed makes
a donation. The donation is subtracted from subjects’ earnings. In the hypothetical condition, by
contrast, the donation votes are declarative – no funds are transferred to the WWF and no adoption
certificate is sent to the adopters. The description of the donation to the subjects in the written
experimental instructions as well as on the adoption page, is adapted accordingly:10
During this part, we ask you to imagine that you were taking part [real: you are going
to take part] in this operation by making a donation, which would be [real: will be]
deducted from your experimental earnings, to adopt a dolphin. The sums collected during this
part would be [real: will be] passed on by us to the WWF, to support their environmental
protection activities. Your donation to the WWF would be [real: will be] recorded on an
oﬃcial certificate, which would be [ real: will be] sent to your home address. We ask you to
make your decisions as if, in this part, we were genuinely oﬀering you the opportunity to adopt
a dolphin, according to the procedure described below. The decisions made during this part
are not, however, taken into account when calculating your experimental earnings. In actual
fact, regardless of your decisions, you will not be adopting a dolphin and your experimental
earnings will not be aﬀected. [real: We will genuinely make it possible for you
to adopt a dolphin if you so decide, according to the procedure described below.
The decisions made during this part are taken into account when calculating your
experimental earnings. This means that if you adopt a dolphin, your donation
will be deducted from your earnings.]
All other experimental features are kept the same in these two treatments. In particular, earnings
stemming from the quiz are real in all treatments to avoid unwarranted wealth diﬀerences between
treatments.
The only change to the procedure in the oath treatments is a preliminary stage based on an oath
form. The oath, provided in Figure 1, reads, “I, the undersigned swear upon my honour that during
the whole experiment, I will tell the truth and always provide honest answers.” This solemn oath is
distributed for signing before any information is provided about the experiment. Each subject enters
alone and is directed to a monitor at the front of the laboratory. The monitor explicitly points out
to the subject before he or she reads the form that he or she is free to sign the oath or not, and
that participation and earnings are not conditional on signing the oath. Importantly, the monitor
does not inform the subjects about the topic of the experiment when asked to take the oath. The
10We follow Cummings and Taylor (1999) in replacing the aﬃrmative language used in real conditions (“you will
participate in the adoption procedure”, “you will adopt a dolphin”, “we commit ourselves to sending your donation to
the WWF”) with a subjunctive language in the hypothetical ones: “we want you to suppose you were to participate
in the adoption procedure”, “you would adopt a dolphin”, “we would commit ourselves to sending your donation to the
WWF” (italics added). The changes specific to the Real treatment appear in brackets.
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Figure 1: Oath form used in the experiments
Solemn Oath
Topic: “JaJLucSh”; Research number 3627A
I undersigned ....................................... swear upon my honour that, during
the whole experiment, I will:
Tell the truth and always provide honest answers.
Paris, ................ Signature...................
Paris School of Economics, 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris – France.
subject is invited to read the oath, and decides whether to sign. Regardless of whether a subject
signs the oath, he or she is thanked and invited to enter the lab. The exact wording used by the
monitors to oﬀer the oath to respondents was scripted to standardize the phrasing of the oath. One
monitor stayed in the lab until all subjects had been presented with the oath. We did this to avoid
communication prior to the experiment. Subjects waiting their turn could neither see nor hear what
was happening at the oath-desk. Note, the informational content of the oath focuses on truth-telling
in itself, and does not describe either the hypothetical bias issue or the potential shortcomings of
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CV studies under hypothetical incentives. Signing the oath was not required to participate in oath
treatments: the refusal rate is 1.7% (1 subject over 60) in the Hypothetical-Oath treatment and
3.3% (2 subjects over 60) in the Real-Oath treatment. The acceptance rate prevents the results
from being influenced by endogenous selection of subjects into the truth-telling promise.11
2.4 Self-reported honesty and happiness
At the end of the experiment, we complement our data with a set of self-reported attitudinal and
happiness questions – note that none of these questions are incentivized. In all treatments and all
sessions, we use three diﬀerent questions, always asked in the same order.12 In the oral instructions,
we insist that this questionnaire is only declarative although we expect subjects to take it seriously.
First, it has been argued that respondents in CV surveys express positive attitudes towards public
goods or concerns for societal problems rather than preferences (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005). To
control for this dimension, we ask subjects to answer a set of questions to elicit their attitudes towards
the WWF and control their knowledge about the WWF’s adoption procedure. Second, subjects are
asked how honest they think they were in their votes in the experiment on a numerical scale ranging
from 1 (totally dishonest) to 7 (totally honest) (see, e.g. Mijovic`-Prelec and Prelec, 2010). Finally, to
assess whether subjects felt more pressure under oath, we also elicit the level of happiness measured
on a typical 7-point scale (from very happy to very unhappy). For each of these variables, we focus
on treatment variations rather than absolute values.
2.5 Experimental procedures
Three 20-subject sessions per treatment (12 sessions and 240 subjects overall, 60 for each treatment),
were conducted in the LEEP laboratory in Paris in May-July 2013.13 Since each subject posts five
votes for adopting a dolphin, this provides 300 observations for each treatment. On arrival, each
subject signs an individual consent form and enters the lab. This form is used in all experiments run
in this laboratory to confirm the informed consent of each participant. The signing of the consent
form happens 15-30 minutes before the oath is administered (in the oath treatment). Each subject
receives the consent form upon arrival at the laboratory and reviews it while the monitor checks their
identity. Subjects then wait until all participants arrive. The signed forms are then collected before
subjects are directed to the laboratory. These procedures aim to make a clear distinction between the
consent form and the oath. This form is mandatory for participation in the experiment. In the oath
treatments only, subjects are then asked to take a truth-telling oath. A computer is then randomly
11We examine the data according to an intention to treat procedure. Note that none of the results are sensitive to
this choice given so few subjects refused to sign the voluntary oath.
12The content of the post experimental questionnaire, including these three questions, is presented in the Appendix,
Section A.
13Please visit http://leep.univ-paris1.fr/accueil.htm for details. The experiment was computerized using a
software program developed under Regate (Zeiliger, 2000) and participants were recruited based on Orsee (Greiner,
2004).
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assigned to each subject and a monitor distributes and reads aloud the instructions.
The experiment begins by asking the subjects to fill out a computerized questionnaire about
socio-economic characteristics (gender, age, ...). The instructions of each part of the experiment are
distributed and read aloud just before it starts and participants are encouraged to ask clarifying ques-
tions, privately answered by the monitor. The first part of the experiment is the general knowledge
quiz (questions along with the four possible answers are displayed one after the other). Subjects
are provided information on their score only at the end of the quiz along with their corresponding
earnings in ecu. The payment rate is 2 ecu per correct answer and the exchange rate is 3 ecu for 1
AC. With an expectation of ten correct answers out of 20, the average monetary earnings for the quiz
would be 7 AC, (payment is rounded up to the next 50 cents), which makes 17 AC in total once added
to the 10 AC show-up fee.14
The second part of the experiment is the adoption referendum. The subjunctive language il-
lustrated in the previous section is used throughout the instructions to diﬀerentiate the Real and
Hypothetical treatments. Once the instructions have been read aloud, subjects are oﬀered to answer
a questionnaire to check their understanding. Once all questions have been answered, the second
part starts. Subjects play each of the five successive referenda one after the other and do not receive
information about the results until all referenda have been completed. If the vote passes in a group in
the real treatment, each subject makes an 11 euros donation taken from experimental earnings, which
we subsidize so as to reach the market clearing price of the donation. At the end of the experiment,
subjects are asked to answer a computerized debriefing questionnaire. The questionnaire collects
information such as whether subjects have participated in other experiments or not, their level of
knowledge of the WWF and its actions, and the extent of their agreement with it. The questionnaire
ends with the three happiness and honesty questions. Finally, the monitor pays each subject privately
in cash.
3 Results 1: How does the oath aﬀect referendum voting?
To summarize individual behavior, we compute the total number of “yes” responses for each subject,
which varies from zero (if the subject votes “no” in all five rounds) to five (if the subject votes “yes”
in all five rounds). Figure 2 presents the empirical distribution functions (EDF) of the total number
of “yes” responses by treatment. In the hypothetical treatments (Figure 2.a), we observe that the
EDF in hypothetical significantly first-order dominates the EDF in hypothetical under oath with
p = .065.15 “Yes” responses are significantly shifted down by signing the oath at the individual level.
14In the experiment, the lower bounds on the earnings from the quiz are 15.5 in the hypothetical no oath treatment,
14 in hypothetical with oath, 12.5 in real no oath and 13.5 in real with oath treatment. Total earnings are always
higher than the laboratory price of the donation.
15This result comes from a bootstrap version of the univariate Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. This modified test provides
correct coverage even when the distributions being compared are not entirely continuous and, unlike the traditional
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, allows for ties (see Abadie, 2002; Sekhon, 2011). The Bootstrap is implemented by drawing
observations under the null that votes are identical in both treatments. The procedure accounts for potential correlation
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Figure 2: Distribution of “yes” responses by treatment
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This shift is explained by an increase in the number of subjects always voting “No” under oath (20% in
hypothetical and 33.3% in hypothetical under oath) and a decrease in the number of subjects always
voting “Yes” (43% in hypothetical and 33.3% in hypothetical under oath). The EDF in real treatments
(Figure 2.b) exhibits the same shift in “yes” responses under oath but to a lesser degree (p = .162).
The shift is now explained by a decrease in the number of subjects always voting “Yes” (15% in real
and 0.5% in real under oath). These figures support our main result: having subjects sign a truth-
telling oath before participation in a dichotomous choice mechanism significantly shifts hypothetical
voting behavior downwards. Prior to signing an oath, hypothetical aﬃrmative responses are 38%
greater than real ones. After signing an oath, this figure drops to 26%, implying hypothetical bias is
reduced by about 30%. In the next sections, we turn to two additional outcomes of the experiment:
the resulting aggregate behavior and the eﬀect of the treatments on self-reported attitudes.
Table 1 summarizes the votes elicited in each treatment and the resulting number of adoptions.
First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist when voting over contri-
butions to the WWF – confirming our ex ante presumptions. Overall, 61.0% of the subjects voted
“yes” in the Hypothetical no oath treatment; whereas 22.3% voted “yes” in the Real no oath treat-
ment. The diﬀerence is significant according to a bootstrap proportion test with p < .001. At the
group level, observed votes lead to 41 adoption decisions (68.3%) in hypothetical no oath treatments
whereas only 5 adoption decisions (8.3%) were made in real no oath treatments. Second, signing the
oath leads to an 11.7% decrease in the “yes” responses in the hypothetical condition, from 61% to
between the five votes of the same subject and for asymmetry in the empirical distribution of votes. The procedure
is based on bootstrapping subjects and their five votes in the sample, instead of considering independent votes, i.e.,
bootstrapping on votes. The number of replications is 9999.
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Table 1: Treatments and Summary Statistics
Round
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 All
Hypothetical no oath
Yes 71.7% 56.7% 53.3% 65.0% 58.3% 61.0%
Adoptions (#) 9 9 6 9 8 41 (68.3%)
Hypothetical with oath
Yes 55.0% 50.0% 46.7% 48.3% 46.7% 49.3%
Adoptions (#) 7 5 6 6 5 29 (48.3%)
Real no oath
Yes 27.1% 18.6% 25.4% 18.6% 23.7% 22.3%
Adoptions (#) 1 0 2 0 2 5 (8.3%)
Real with oath
Yes 11.7% 11.7% 16.7% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Adoptions (#) 0 1 0 1 1 3 (5.0%)
Note. For each treatment, the Table provides the percentage of “yes” votes observed by period and overall as well as the number
of adoptions realized. There were three sessions (60 subjects and 12 groups) per treatment.
49.3%. The p-value of this decrease according to a unilateral bootstrap proportion test is p = .125.16
This results in a 20% drop in the adoption rate when subjects are under oath (from 68% to 48%), a
figure however still greater than in the real condition (8%). In the real treatment, the oath induces
a slight decrease in the “yes” response rate, from 22.3% to 15%, a diﬀerence that is not statistically
significant (p = .198).17
By construction, round eﬀects are driven solely by uncertain subjects—subjects who are not
confident and change their vote from one round to the other. In the following, we examine how
uncertain subjects vote across rounds. In all treatments, except Real with Oath, we observe that
uncertain subjects are more likely to cast a “yes” vote in the first round than in forthcoming rounds
2 to 5. Proportions of “yes” votes in round 1 are 77.2%, 56.0% and 63.7% in Hypothetical no Oath,
Hypothetical with Oath and Real no Oath, whereas they are, on average, 40.9%, 43.8% and 34.1%
in rounds 2 to 5. In Real Oath, we observe a small increase in uncertain subjects voting in favor
of the adoption (22% in round 1, 36.1% in rounds 2 to 5). Bootstrap proportion tests indicate that
there are no significant diﬀerences in “yes” votes between Hypothetical no Oath and Real no Oath
when looking separately at round 1 (p=0.482) and at rounds 2 to 5 (p=0.428). In addition, we find
16In our setting, we cannot implement standard Mann-Whitney tests since observations are independent at the
individual level but not at the vote level. Each subject votes 5 times and this can induce within subject correlation. We
therefore cannot carry out standard Mann-Whitney tests, which rely on the assumption of independence of observations.
Our bootstrap procedure consists of bootstrapping on subjects and their five votes rather than bootstrapping on
votes. The bootstrap proportion test accounts for within subject correlation without specifying it parametrically (see
Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren 2013 for more details). In addition, bootstrap tests have more statistical power
for small sample sizes.
17 Overall, our estimates of the treatment eﬀects on subjects’ preferences remain quite imprecise despite important
quantitative diﬀerences. This illustrates the diﬃculty to testbed elicitation mechanisms based on discrete choice
elicitation formats – in which continuous underlying preferences are reduced to 2 observable ranges. We note, however,
that the preferences we elicit are statistically very close to those observed in Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren
(2013)—see the Appendix, Section B.
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no eﬀect of the oath on hypothetical votes in round 1 (p=0.379) and in rounds 2 to 5 taken together
(p=0.723). The small diﬀerence between the proportion of “yes” votes in real no oath and real with
oath is also not significant with p=0.271.
We now examine the degree of hypothetical bias and the eﬀect of the oath conditional on the
strength of preferences of subjects. In line with stochastic choice theory (see Köbberling, 2006;
Rustichini, 2008), we split the sample into two groups: confident subjects who vote identically in
all 5 rounds (either all “yes” or all “no”) and non-confident subjects who change their vote in at
least one round.18 A large majority of subjects are confident with their choice in all 4 treatments:
63.3% in hypothetical, 66.7% in hypothetical under oath, 70.0% in real and 70.0% in real under
oath. Further, this result indicates the oath has no eﬀect on the strength of the preferences. Our
results are informative–we observe that hypothetical bias only exists for confident subjects and the
oath only decreases bias for these confident subjects. The proportion of “yes” votes in hypothetical
for confident subjects is 68.4% and 18.3% in real, a significant 50.1% decrease (p < 0.001). Under
oath, the proportion of “yes” for confident subjects decreases to 50% (p = 0.092). In contrast, now
consider the sample of non-confident subjects. Here the proportion of “yes” votes in hypothetical is
48.2% and 40% in real–we find no hypothetical bias in this group (the diﬀerence is not significant
with p = 0.335). In addition, the oath has no eﬀect on the votes of non-confident respondents with
48.0% voting “yes” in hypothetical under oath (p = 0.981). This finding is re-assuring. Based on
Commitment Theory, there is no reason why a truth-telling commitment device such as the oath
should work when a person has diﬃculties knowing his or her own preferences, i.e. asking a subject
to be truthful when she does not even know the truth, or she is experimenting with the truth, is futile
in our setting.
We assess the robustness of the results by conditioning the eﬀect of the treatments on participants’
characteristics. Participant characteristics include gender, age, occupational status and whether or
not the subject attended lab experiments in the past. Table 2 provides the results from a random
eﬀect panel Probit regression of the decision to vote “yes” on individual characteristics, round dummies
and treatment eﬀects measured by three dummy variables (Hypothetical, Hypothetical ⇥ Oath and
Real ⇥ Oath).19 The reference observation is a subject in the real no oath treatment. The coeﬃcient
18In theory, the observed frequency of choices provides an axiomatic cardinal and continuous measure of the strength
of preferences. We split the sample into two groups to ensure large enough sample sizes.
19Our intent in estimating the panel Probit model is to check if the result is robust to controlling for observed
heterogeneity that would have been missed in our unconditional statistics (although one may argue the purpose of a
lab experiment is to testbed mechanisms/theories on a properly randomized homogeneous population so that conditional
statistics are not needed). When one assumes that there exists a latent variable that generates voting behavior as it
is assumed in a Probit model, one may wonder whether the total eﬀect of the oath or monetary incentives come from
a change in the mean preference or the sample variance (see Haab, Huang, and Whitehead, 1999) —note that this
distinction may not be relevant if one is only interested in the marginal eﬀect of the experimental treatment such as
we are – see, e.g., Harrison (2006). Likelihood ratio Heteroskedasticity tests (available from the authors on request)
indicate the treatment variables hypothetical and oath have no or barely significant eﬀect on the variance of the latent
variable in basic Probit regressions carried out for each round independently (LR joint tests p-value for each round are
p = 0.360, p = 0.123, p = 0.100, p = .0.732 and p = .0.121). Further research choosing to explore this issue in more
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Table 2: Probit regression on treatment variables
Coeﬃcient Marginal eﬀects p-value
Treatment eﬀects
Constant -1.716 - .114
Hypothetical 2.942 0.693 .000
Hypothetical ⇥ Oath -0.817 -0.172 .078
Real ⇥ Oath -0.278 -0.067 .633
Controls
Age 0.014 0.026 .543
Male 0.102 0.003 .809
Occupational status (ref. is employed)
Unemployed -1.196 -0.184 .167
Student no grant -0.454 -0.116 .566
Student with a job 0.431 0.130 .733
Student with a grant -1.606 -0.226 .114
Note. Individual random eﬀect panel Probit model of individual yes vote on treatment dummies and
individual characteristics (n = 239⇥ t = 5). The endogenous variable is the “yes” vote. Round (fixed)
eﬀects are controlled for in the estimation but omitted here. Joint nullity test: Wald = 51.91 with
p< 0.001. Marginal eﬀects are computed at the means of continuous independent variables, for binary
covariates a discrete change from 0 to 1 is considered (see Williams, 2012).
associated with the dummy variable Hypothetical is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating
a clear hypothetical bias in the baseline condition. Being in the hypothetical treatment induces a
69.3% increase in the probability of voting “yes” as compared to real. The conditioning further
weakens the eﬀect of the oath in the real context: according to the interaction term Real ⇥ Oath, the
oath induces a slight decrease of “yes” answers (6.7%), which is far from being significantly diﬀerent
from 0 (p = .633).
The interaction term Hypothetical ⇥ Oath measures the treatment eﬀect of implementing an oath
in the hypothetical treatment. The eﬀect is negative (-0.809) and significant at a 10% threshold with
p = .078 –restricting the test to the working hypothesis of a decrease of hypothetical bias, the eﬀect of
the oath is significant at a 5% threshold with p = .039. Conditional on observed heterogeneity of the
subject pool, the oath induces a 17.2% decrease in the probability of voting “yes” in the hypothetical
context. A Wald test, however, rejects the null hypothesis that Hypothetical ⇥ Oath + Hypothetical
=0 (Wald=18.72 with p = .000), implying that while the oath decreases “yes” votes in hypothetical
treatments, it fails to completely eliminate the observed hypothetical bias. Note there is a drawback
of enhanced external validity through eliciting preferences for a homegrown good, such as the WWF
donation—there is a loss of control over the true underlying preferences. Subjects enter the laboratory
with their own private valuation of the good. As a long-standing consequence, there is no obvious way
detail would need to define an appropriate structural form that integrated more explicitly a theory of incentives and
oath on preferences, which is beyond the scope of this current project.
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Figure 3: Empirical Distribution Function (EDF) of self-reported attitudes
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Note. Answers are on a 7-point scale: What is your opinion of the WWF’s activities? (from totally opposed to totally in favor);
Please rate how honest you think you were in your votes (from Not at all honest to Totally honest) and Please indicate how
happy you are at the moment. The first line of Figures presents EDF for the hypothetical treatments whereas the second line
presents the EDF for real treatments.
to choose the benchmark situation to which one should compare the variation in elicited preferences.
Under monetary incentives, in particular, subjects may undermine their true preferences by voting
“no” as a way to opt-out of the elicitation mechanism (Smith, 1994; Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and
Shogren, 2011). For further contextual evidence of the eﬀect of the oath on preference elicitation,
we now turn to the correlation of the variation in self-reported honesty with the observed changes in
voting behavior.
4 Results 2: Additional insight into why the oath aﬀects voting
To gain insight into why the oath induced the observed variations in voting behavior, we now explore
how the oath aﬀected responses to the attitudinal questions.20 Figure 3 presents the EDF of answers
20We restrict this presentation to those questions for which we do observe some significant diﬀerences between
treatments.
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to three questions: the level of agreement with the WWF, self-declared honesty, and happiness.21
Table 3 reports a set of separate ordered Probit regressions on the same three variables.
4.1 Agreement with WWF actions and surrogate voting
Figures 3.a present the EDF’s of subject’s level of agreement with WWF actions in the real (bottom
part) and hypothetical (upper part) treatments. This question addresses the long-standing question
of whether subjects use the elicitation exercise to express generic positive attitudes towards public
goods, or concerns for societal problems, rather than their true underlying preferences (see Kahneman
and Knetsch, 1992).
This general concern about surrogate voting is supported by comparing behavior in the two
benchmark treatments: the EDF in hypothetical without oath first-order dominates the EDF in real
without oath (p = .024). This result implies that respondents in hypothetical exhibit a stronger
agreement with WWF than in the real treatment, which is in line with a higher willingness to vote
“yes” in the hypothetical condition. Interestingly, this result no longer holds when subjects are under
oath. The EDF in hypothetical under oath and real are not significantly diﬀerent (p = .697). We
find similar results for (i) the EDF in hypothetical under oath and real under oath (p = .834) and
(ii) the EDF in real and real under oath (p = .998). This means that the level of agreement with
WWF actions is only greater in the hypothetical no oath treatment. Our econometric regressions
confirm these results. The left-hand side of Table 3 reports the results of an ordered Probit regression
using subjects’ level of agreement with the WWF actions as the dependent variable. Subjects in
hypothetical treatments exhibit stronger agreement with WWF than in real ones (p = .054). Subjects
under oath with and without monetary incentives express the same level of agreement (p = .923 and
p = .854). The oath seems to correct for a positive shift in agreement with the WWF induced
by the absence of monetary incentives. Because a large discrepancy between hypothetical and real
votes remains when subjects are under oath, this result also suggests that this shift is not the main
explanation of hypothetical bias.
4.2 The eﬀect of the oath on self-declared honesty
We now turn to self-declared honesty. The main goal of this question is to elicit the degree of
strategic voting or conscious manipulation of the elicitation exercise. Figures 3.b present the EDF
of how honest subjects thought they were in their votes. We find evidence that subjects know they
are reporting insincere preferences more frequently without monetary incentives. The EDF in real
21Since these measures are self reported and hypothetical, they may be noisy signals of the underlying attitudes
of interest and we acknowledge that such self-reported attitudinal information should be interpreted with caution.
The changes according to the treatment however, remain informative about underlying changes in attitudes as there
is no reason to expect a correlation between the noise and the treatments. While treatments are truly exogenous,
allowing for regressions of attitudes on treatment variables, there are obvious endogeneity issues if one explains votes
by self-reported attitudes. It is not our aim to disentangle the respective eﬀect of the oath on attitudes and reported
preferences; but rather to gather some information on the channel through which the oath changes behavior.
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Table 3: Treatment eﬀects on self reported honesty and care questions
Agreement Honesty Happiness
with WWF self
Parameter Parameter Parameter
estimates p-value estimates p-value estimates p-value
Treatment eﬀects
Hypothetical .389 .054 -.769 .003 -.033 .115
Hypothetical ⇥ Oath -.019 .923 .031 .791 -.265 .012
Real ⇥ Oath .035 .854 .317 .196 -.273 .202
Cutoﬀ points (st.error)
cut 1 -3.044 (.459) -2.342 (.388) -1.733 (.358)
cut 2 -2.685 (.422) -1.589 (.413) -1.441 (.303)
cut 3 -2.484 (.410) -1.142 (.418) -0.726 (.259)
cut 4 -1.460 (.384) -0.310 (.393) -0.087 (.296)
cut 5 -0.678 (.378) — 0.803 (.311)
cut 6 0.056 (.378) — 1.749 (.352)
Note. Ordered Probit models on self reported attitudes: the left-hand side uses answers on a 7-point scale to the question: What
is your opinion of the WWF’s activities? (from totally opposed to totally in favor); the second model relies on answers from a
7-point scale to the question Please rate how honest you think you were in your votes (from Not at all honest to Totally honest)
and the third model relies on answers from a 7-point scale to the question Please indicate how happy you are at the moment. The
top rows report the results of treatment dummies and individual characteristics (n = 239). The bottom part of the Table reports
the cutoﬀ parameters, i.e. the thresholds associated by Probit model to each possible answer in order to map the discrete data
into the latent variable—for the honesty question, only 4 cut points (instead of 6) are estimated as no subjects answered neither
2 nor 3 on the scale. Results are conditioned on Round (fixed) eﬀects, subject age, gender, grant, and employment status. A full
set of results are available from the authors upon request. Joint nullity test: Wald = 51.91 with p< 0.001. Marginal eﬀects are
computed at the means of continuous independent variables, for binary covariates a discrete change from 0 to 1 is considered (see
Williams, 2012).
first order dominates the EDF in hypothetical (p < .001): subjects rate themselves as significantly
less honest in hypothetical than in real treatments. For instance, 46.7% of subjects in hypothetical
declare themselves as totally honest, whereas 77.9% do so in real.
Regarding the eﬀect of the oath, two interesting results emerge. First, the EDF’s are statistically
the same for hypothetical and real treatments when subjects are under oath (p = .133). In terms
of self-perceived honesty, the two oath treatments thus achieve the same outcome. Additionally,
the EDF for the real no oath treatment is statistically indiﬀerent from that for the hypothetical
oath treatment (p = .631). Again, conditional analysis confirms these results. The model in the
center column of Table 3 reports the results of an ordered Probit regression for the honesty question.
The coeﬃcient associated with the hypothetical dummy is negative and significant (p = .003) and
the coeﬃcients for the hypothetical oath and real oath dummies are not significant (p = .791 and
p = .196). In hypothetical under oath treatments, 77.3% of subjects for instance declare to be totally
honest, compared to 85% in real under oath treatments.
Despite the discrepancy in actual voting behavior, this outcome variable thus shows that the oath
achieves to elicit the same level of self-perceived honesty in hypothetical as in the baseline, real-no oath
and real-oath treatments. Since subjects perceive themselves to be as honest in hypothetical-oath
treatments as they are in a real referendum but at the same time vote yes more often, this suggests
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one possible reason why a hypothetical bias remains after signing the oath. In our hypothetical
referendum, subjects have to form an assessment about what they would do if votes were real. But
their vote has no immediate consequences on protecting the environment; even if a majority votes
“yes”, no contribution is made to the WWF. In that context, voting “yes” in the referendum can serve
as a self-serving assessment, making them too optimistic about their chances of voting “yes” in a
real referendum.22 Self-serving may occur here because people learn that they are nature preserving
persons when they vote “yes” in the referendum. This induces self-deception, i.e. people think they
would vote “yes” more often than what they actually do. Mijovic`-Prelec and Prelec (2010), building
on self-signaling theory, shows that self-deception arises if people not only derive utility from actions
(outcome utility) but also from learning about their inaccessible characteristics by doing those actions
(diagnostic utility)—see also, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2002); Caplin and Leahy (2001). It is this
diagnostic utility that makes people engage in self-deception, whether they are aware of it or not.
What the answers to our honesty question suggest is that even subjects under oath engage in self-
deception (and are not aware of it as in Quattrone and Tversky, 1984).
4.3 Does the oath simply elicit higher cognitive eﬀort?
Third, we assess the degree of pressure imposed on subjects signing an oath by measuring their
happiness on a 7-point scale. Assuming we can measure happiness as a cardinal scalar, we observe
that subjects under oath are less happy than subjects in the hypothetical condition: mean happiness is
5.13 in hypothetical and 4.76 and 4.78 in hypothetical with oath and real with oath. A Mann-Whitney
test indicates that happiness tends to have larger values in hypothetical than in hypothetical with oath
(p = .018) and real with oath (p = .062). Mean happiness in real no oath treatments, by contrast,
is comparable to that in hypothetical no oath treatments (p = .122). When no oath treatments
are pooled against oath treatments, a Mann-Whitney test confirms the positive shift in happiness
induced by the oath (p = 0.018). The EDF in Figures 3.c better illustrates this phenomenon. The
EDF in non oath treatments first-order dominates the EDF in oath treatments, significantly in the
hypothetical treatments (p = .051) and not significantly in the real treatments (p = .110).23
Such a decrease in average happiness induced by the oath suggests the oath may not be an
22In their well-known experiment on self-deception, Quattrone and Tversky (1984) explained to subjects that a
certain medical condition was associated with cold tolerance (high or low depending on the experimental condition
considered). Subjects were then asked to put their hands in very cold water as long as they could. Experimental results
show that subjects tend to let their hands in the cold water longer (or less depending on the experimental condition)
although this does not change the fact that they have the medical condition or not. In debriefing interviews, subjects
are often not aware that they were self-deceiving themselves about this.
23The third column of Table 3 provides further statistical evidence on that result. We take happiness as an ordinal
measure and estimate an ordered Probit similar to that applied to previous attitude variables. The regression results
indicate that happiness decreases significantly in the hypothetical under oath treatment (p = .012), whereas the decrease
is not significant in the real under oath treatment (p = .202). A test of equality of parameters associated with the
hypothetical under oath and real under oath treatments however cannot reject the null of equality with p = .972. We
also estimate the unique eﬀect of being under oath, whether with or without monetary incentives. Results indicate
that the parameter associated with the oath is negative and significant with p = .015.
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Figure 4: Response time in the first round by treatments
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innocuous instrument. Given the challenges of measuring happiness, a decrease in happiness remains
hard to interpret in terms of improved or lower internal validity of the results. For instance, it
can either reflect that subjects feel uncomfortable with the experimental exercise after the oath –and
maybe over-react to the environment– or it could reflect the opposite: the oath elicits higher cognitive
eﬀorts when people are asked to form and declare their preferences. Our low refusal rate seems to
contradict the first explanation.
A study of response time in the experiment provides further insights on the cognitive eﬀort
explanation.24 If the oath induces more cognitive eﬀorts because subject take the overall valuation
task more seriously, we should observe an increase in response time under oath whatever the vote
made by subjects. To avoid mixing up cognitive eﬀort and learning, we focus only on the first
voting round.25 Figure 4 compares the observed response across treatments. The quartiles of the
distribution of response times for all treatments together are first computed in round 1. We then
compute the proportion of response times in period 1 in each treatment that fall in each quartile of the
distribution. We observe an upward shift in response time in the hypothetical under oath treatment
as compared to the hypothetical treatment. The proportion of response times in the first quartile
decreases from 28.3% in hypothetical to 21.7% in hypothetical under oath whereas the proportion in
the fourth quartile increases from 23.3% to 28.3%. The shift in response times induced by the oath
seems to go the other way around in real treatments, with subjects in the real under oath treatment
responding quicker than in the real treatment. There is an increase in the share of response times
24In using response times as a measure of cognitive eﬀort, we follow Rubinstein (2007) who shows that short response
time is usually associated with instinctive response and longer response time with choices based on more active cognitive
reasoning.
25The results are fairly similar when considering all 5 votes. It is worth noting that in doing so, we loose a great
deal of statistical power. Given that study of response time usually requires large sample sizes, the results can only be
interpreted with caution. Statistics on response time for all 5 votes are available upon request.
20
Table 4: Happiness by vote in the first round and treatment
Hyp. Hyp Oath Real Real Oath
Vote “Yes” 5.26 4.82 5.44 4.29
Vote “No” 4.82 4.70 4.91 4.85
Note. For each treatment in column and each individual vote in the first round in row, the table
provides the average level of happiness as measured by the post-experiment questionnaire (on a scale
ranging from 1 to 7).
falling in the first quartile (21.7% in real and 26.7% in real under oath) and a decrease of the share in
the fourth quartile (from 28.3% to 18.3%)—in which people take more than 16 seconds to vote. The
small upward shift in response times in hypothetical and the small downward shift in real appear to
go against the idea that the oath induces increased cognitive eﬀort for all subjects under oath.
This asymmetric eﬀect rather suggests another explanation. The oath may make self-serving
assessments more costly, and aﬀects only those subjects who are willing to vote yes. Thus, the
change in happiness only comes from the reduction in the tendency to vote “yes”. If this is the case
and if we take self-declared happiness as a proxy for utility, we should observe that the oath only
decreases happiness of subjects who vote “Yes” in oath treatments. Table 4 presents mean happiness
levels by vote and treatment. We observe an asymmetry between “Yes” and “No” votes in non-oath
treatments, subjects declare themselves happier when they voted “Yes” in the first round compared to
when they voted “No”. The diﬀerence is significant in hypothetical (p = .0719) and in real (p = .055)
according to Mann-Whitney tests. When non-oath treatments are merged together, the diﬀerence
is even more significant with p = 0.018. This is not the case for oath treatments. All subjects,
whether they voted “Yes” or “No” express similar levels of happiness. The happiness level of subjects
in the oath treatments corresponds to that of subjects who voted “No” in the first round in non-oath
treatments.
To summarize our results to these three attitude questions, the correlations between self-reported
measures with the treatment eﬀects suggest truthfulness improves under oath: subjects are less prone
to use the vote to express positive general attitudes towards public goods and they see themselves as
more sincere in their answers. The study of happiness combined with that of response time supports
the idea that the oath decreases the tendency to engage in self-serving assessments. That would also
explain the small, albeit insignificant, decrease in “Yes” votes in real under oath as compared to the
real treatment. This all suggests future avenues to explore the power and limits of using a rare but
powerful social mechanism like the oath in an everyday setting like a survey.
5 Conclusion
Preference elicitation methods—even a straightforward approach like a binary voting referenda—can
suﬀer from hypothetical bias. Evidence from laboratory experiments exploring hypothetical bias in
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induced-value referendum voting behavior finds mixed results depending on whether one considers
the aggregate vote or individual behavior: weak hypothetical bias at the aggregate level, but many
mistakes and mis-voting at the individual level (Taylor, McKee, Laury, and Cummings, 2001). With-
out real economic commitment, people can allow their minds to wander towards social preferences,
preference uncertainty, or inconsistent choices. When our choices do not have real consequences,
we can experiment with our hypothetical votes or hypothetical dollars. We float trial balloons, we
take straw polls, we test the wind. Without market pressure (i.e, money pump or arbitrage) to help
concentrate the mind on the real consequences of the vote at hand, people are free to wander from
the consistent and rational choice. The challenge is that rationality in economics is a social construct
based on active market exchange, not an individual concept based on isolated introspection (see for
example Arrow, 1987). For a more detailed discussion in the context of non-market valuation, see
Shogren (2006, 2012) who discusses how to identify and create the missing institutional context, or
“money pumps”, to induce more rational choice in non-market valuation and environmental protec-
tion. These market or non-market institutions can help people help themselves by learning what
it means to be the rational agents economists presume to live in our models (also see e.g., Cherry,
Crocker, and Shogren, 2003). Herein we ask whether we can create this real economic commitment
in a referendum vote with a non-market commitment device—the solemn oath.
Under normal conventions (money on the barrelhead), the oath acts as a substitute for real
economic commitment (albeit an imperfect one). No real money is at risk. But if one broadens out
the definition to include non-market goods lacking an exchange institute, the oath can be considered
a real economic commitment within this non-market space. Commitment-via-oath helps a person
match his or her words with deeds. While no real money is at risk, his or her real honor is—which to
us is a real economic commitment through a non-market device in a non-market institutional setting.
A Jeremy Bentham quote we have used before is worth repeating here: “What gives an oath the
degree of eﬃcacy it possesses, is, that in most points, and with most men, a declaration upon oath
includes a declaration upon honor: the laws of honor enjoining as to those points the observance of
an oath. The deference shown is paid in appearance to the religious ceremony: but in reality it is
paid, even by the most pious religionists, much more to the moral engagement than to the religious”
(Bentham, 1827).
We explore in a referendum experiment whether signing a solemn oath to tell the truth can reduce
hypothetical bias (also see recent work by others who have tested the robustness of the oath idea
using alternative elicitation mechanisms, and sample populations, e.g., Carlsson, Kataria, Krupnick,
Lampi, Lofgren, Qin, and Sterner, 2013; de Magistris and Pascucci, 2014). Our results suggest
the oath can work to fill the gap between stated intentions and real economic commitments: the
oath causes hypothetical “yes” response rates to significantly decrease, while real “yes” response rates
remained statistically identical. As we elicit preferences for a homegrown good, the results may not
be related to the true underlying preferences for the good. The correlation of the observed variation
in stated preferences with self-reported measures of honesty however supports the idea that the oath
enhances the truthfulness of votes. Having subjects (freely) sign an oath to provide honest answers
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makes them more likely to do so even without any actual economic commitment.
Beyond the particular application of our results to contingent valuation studies, this evidence
suggests one can improve the accuracy of preferences elicited in the lab through commitment devices
such as an oath. This point remains a speculative interpretation of our results as long as the oath
has not been applied to a wider range of experimental applications. Further research will explore this
avenue.
What are potential field applications of the referendum under oath? First, taking the oath from
the lab to the field can be done within stated preference surveys designed to elicit truthful preferences
for non-market goods, e.g., Carlsson, Kataria, Krupnick, Lampi, Lofgren, Qin, and Sterner (2013).
Using the popular referendum method with and without the oath we can test for potential impacts,
although we have no rigorous baseline to judge complete success. Second and more broadly, the use
of the voting-referendum under oath has been implemented for those registering to vote in Vermont.
Either taken in-person or in front of a notary, every person registering to vote must take the Voter’s
Oath (previously called the Freeman’s Oath):
The Voter’s Oath: You solemnly swear or aﬃrm that whenever you give your
vote or suﬀrage, touching any matter that concerns the State of Vermont, you
will do it so as in your conscience you shall judge will most conduce to the best
good of the same, as established by the Constitution, without fear or favor of any
person. [Voter’s Oath, Vermont Constitution, Chapter II, Section 42 ]
This seems to be the only explicit Oath asking the voter to vote based on his or her conscience. Other
US states require each voter to swear under penalty of perjury that he or she meets the qualifications
to vote (e.g., not voted elsewhere, a state citizen, not convicted of a felony). An idea worthy of future
research would be to explore whether a Vermont-style Voter’s Oath could be implemented in other
field applications.
On a related note regarding the use of a commitment device in a real world policy, consider the
recent Paris Agreement on climate change. In Paris, countries used a “pledge and review” model as
the primary mechanism to coordinate collective action on carbon emission reductions (see e.g., Aldy,
Pizer, and Keigo, 2016; Fawcett et al., 2015). Paralleling the oath that we examine, the pledge is
a voluntary commitment made by each country to develop and implement a domestic action plan
subject to international review to evaluate the adequacy of the action. The pledge-as-commitment
device is designed to act as a focal point mechanism to increase trust and to coordinate actions better.
In a recent lab experiment on coordination under oath, we found that this was the case (Jacquemet,
Luchini, Shogren, and Zylbersztejn, 2015). We observed that coordination with communication under
oath improved by over fifty percent relative to the no oath baseline, and that senders were more likely
to send truthful signals under oath, while receivers were slightly more likely to believe the signals
sent. Further studies into how commitment and coordination under alternative allocation/sharing
rules with the oath/pledge seems most worthwhile.
23
Finally, we acknowledge that we run risk of alienating people by using such a strong commitment
device like the oath for a non-market valuation exercise. Our experience with the oath over the last
decade however suggests the opposite: we observe a high acceptance rate (95 to 100%) and subjects
say to the monitor while signing the oath in our experiments that “of course I will tell the truth” (we
have had about 1000 subjects take the oath in the lab). Recall we designed our oath procedure based
on the “compliance without pressure” literature: (1) subjects are free to sign, (2) participation and
monetary gains are not conditional on signing the oath, and (3) subjects are unaware about what is
going to happen in the lab afterwards. Social psychology tells us that under these three conditions
people are most likely to comply without pressure or reactance, which appears to be what they do
in our experiment. That said, one future experimental direction could be to see if one could use the
oath to generate sincere behavior without the same level of moral pressure implied by “truth-telling”.
One idea that seems worthy to explore in future work is examine whether an oath that commits each
subject to “take the valuation exercise seriously by thinking about my answers carefully and providing
honest answers” would generate similar behavior as the truth-telling oath.
Our focus on the solemn oath was driven by the aim of investigating the strongest real-world
commitment device we could replicate in the lab. Now that we have established the oath can create
commitment, the next step is to back down from this strong position and explore how implementing
weaker forms of commitment like a promise or pledge or even an honor code will aﬀect behavior in a
survey. This is an area worthy of further research.
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Appendix
A Post-experimental questionnaire
The voting stage is now over. Before proceeding to the payment of your winnings, we would be grateful if
you could answer a series of questions. There are no right or wrong answers; take your time in answering the
questions because your answers are important for the research in which you are taking part. It is impossible
to connect these answers to your identity.
(The questionnaire starts with the following debriefing questions that appear one at a time on the screen).
1. Do you belong to an environmental association? (YES / NO)
2. Did you know of the WWF before taking part in this experiment? (YES / NO)
3. Did you know of the WWF’s dolphin adoption programme before taking part in this experiment? (YES
/ NO)
4. Have you previously adopted an animal to help an association for the protection of nature? (YES /
NO)
5. What is your opinion of the WWF’s activities? (Totally opposed, opposed, moderately opposed, no
opinion, moderately in favour, in favour, totally in favour)
(The attitudinal questions below straightly follow, with each question and the scale on each screen).
1. Using the scale below, please indicate how happy you are at the moment:
+ + + + + + +
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Very
unhappy Happy
2. Using the scale below, please indicate how honest you were during the experiment
+ + + + + + +
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at Totally
all honest honest
3. Using the scale below, please indicate how honest the other participants were during the experiment
+ + + + + + +
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at Totally
all honest honest
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B Simulations of voting behavior in the referendum and of bidding
behavior in Vickrey auctions
Herein, we simulate how subjects observed in Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013) would have voted
in a 11 euros contribution referendum mechanism: a bid equal to or greater than 11 euros is interpreted as a
“yes” vote and “no” vote otherwise.
We proceed by random sampling of subjects with replacement as for the boostrap proportion tests to
account for within-subject correlation. In each simulation, we draw subjects and their five bids in the Vickrey
auctions sample. We proceed similarly for the referendum experiment, we draw subjects and their five votes.
In a typical auction simulation, we compute the proportion of bids equal to or greater than 11 euros whereas
in a referendum simulation we obtain directly this proportion by counting “Yes” votes . We then generate
confidence intervals from both experiments based these simulations. With a 5% level of confidence the results
are:
Hypothetical Real
No oath With Oath No oath With Oath
Referendum [52.3%; 69.6%] [40.3%; 58.3%] [14.6%; 30.7%] [9.6%; 21.0%]
Vickrey Auction [52.2%; 84.0%] [23.0%; 49.0%] [ 2.0%; 20.0%] —
C Happiness ordered Probit with oath as a single variable
Parameter p-value
estimates
Treatment eﬀects
Hypothetical without oath -0.032 .778
Oath -0.269 .015
Controls
Age 0.019 .004
Male -0.367 .003
Occupational status (ref. is employed)
Unemployed 0.171 .267
Student no grant 0.219 .370
Student with a job 0.510 .198
Student with a grant 0.577 .081
Cut points (s.e)
cut 1 -1.733 (.359)
cut 2 -1.440 (.303)
cut 3 -0.727 (.258)
cut 4 0.086 (.296)
cut 5 0.802 (.311)
cut 6 1.749 (.353)
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